Technology and Political Interdependence:

Technology and Political Interdependence:

Canada, Japan, and the United States

（科学技術と政治的相互依存―カナダ、日本、アメリカ合衆国）

Wallace Gagne*

SUMMARY IN JAPANESE：1945年に始まった日米の長い緊密協力期は、今まさに終焉を迎えようとしているかに見える。責任分担、相互利益の議論は、取るに足らない批判と的外れの提言とに取って代わられつつある。このように日米関係がますます波立っているのと同時に、カナダとアメリカ合衆国も、自由貿易協定から生じる問題と誤解によってこの二国の憤慨と苛立ちが増すにつれ、緊張の時期に突入しようとしている。

現在の日米関係の困難さには、アメリカ側から聞こえる日本の対米投資、アメリカの政策決定への影響の増大に関する不満は、過去三十年以上にわたってカナダがアメリカに対して露にしてきた不満とまったく同じである、という皮肉な側面がある。したがってこの三国間関係には循環パターンが存在し、現在、影響力の淵源はアメリカから日本へと移行しているようである。この移行の結果として、今アメリカは、かつてならば世界の中の他の小国へ転嫁できていたものと同種の国外からの影響を経験しているのである。

本稿は、現代科学技術の意味を説くことから始められる。ギリシャ人に“techne”と呼ばれた古代技術は自然と完全に調和していたのに対し、現代科学技術は、自然とは資源であり、人間の合理的計算によって利用されるべきものであるとの認識から出発している。現代科学技術はその本質において挑発的である。それは倫理体系によって制限されるものではないために、人的資源、非人的資源の無制限の開発、利用に繋がる結果となった。

次に、この現代科学技術がカナダ、日本、アメリカの三国間に経済面、技術面、政治面において極めて動的な関係を作ることにいかに寄与したかが論じられる。技術発展の過程において、カナダはアメリカからの大規模な直接投資を受け入れ続けてきた。これによって、カナダはアメリカの経済面においての「衛星」となることになった。これに反し、日本は海外からの直接投資を厳しく制限してきた。この結果、日本は国防、商品市場においてアメリカに大きく依存してきたにも拘らず、経済の独自性を維持することによって高度の政治的、経済的独立を確保することに成功したのである。

最後に、カナダ、日本、アメリカ三国間関係の将来の可能性が展望される。日本は更なる国家的自律性に向けて邁進している。しかしその他方でカナダは、内的勢力が、それでなくても既に脆弱な国家的統一を脅かしており、またアメリカの科学技術面での「大陸主義」によってカナダの経済的自律性の僅かな残留部分が更に侵食されつつある、という未知の不安定期に入っているのである。

As a Canadian watching the growing quarrel between Japan and the United States, many of the criticisms and complaints which the Americans have recently been making about the Japanese seem strangely familiar. The reason they seem familiar is because they are many of the same criticisms and complaints which Canadians have been making about the Americans for the past thirty years.

In the case of America and Japan, much of the present problem involves trade. Many Americans believe that Japan’s large trade surplus with the United States is caused by Japanese barriers to American goods and services. Many Americans also believe that the high level of Japanese imports, particularly in such areas as automobiles and consumer electronics, are causing many American workers to lose their jobs.

While Canada has also had its differences with the United States in matters of trade, it is in the area of investment by the Japanese in the American economy that American complaints sound most familiar to Canadians. After many years of welcoming investment in the United States by foreigners, many Americans are now concerned that Japanese investment is undermining America’s economic independence, threatening American culture and leading to a loss of political sovereignty. These concerns are reminiscent of the concerns which some Canadians have expressed during the last thirty years about the threat posed to Canada’s independence by the high levels of American ownership and control of the Canadian economy.

America’s economic problems with Japan have produced a broad spectrum of reactions among concerned Americans. Those who see the situation as primarily an American problem tend to favor such solutions as improving American education, encouraging savings and investment, and stimulating research and development. Those who see it as a mutual set of difficulties talk about “developing a level playing field” and breaking down barriers to free trade. On the other side of the spectrum, those who blame Japan for America’s difficulties vary in their reactions from those who advocate “Buy American” and “America First,” to those who favor strong protectionist measures against Japanese imports, and finally those extremists who burn Japanese flags, smash Japanese automobiles, and attack people of Japanese ancestry.

In response to this wave of criticism and complaints from the Americans, some Japanese have reacted with strong statements as well. Generally speaking, Japanese leaders try to avoid direct confrontations with critics and opponents. Instead, they attempt to get those who disagree with them to understand their position. In January and February of 1992, however, a series of untimely remarks by several leading Japanese politicians made a bad situation worse. Particularly inflammatory were accusations that American workers were losing the work ethic. Coming at a time when major American corporations were announcing tens of thousands of layoffs, these statements served only to intensify the feeling among many Americans that their country was in trouble because of unfair tactics by the Japanese.

In the case of Canada and the United States, the American economic presence in Canada has also produced a spectrum of reactions. Generally speaking, most Canadians, and particularly Canada’s economic and political elite, have welcomed closer economic ties with the United States because they see this as the best way to “get the country going.” However, not all Canadians have welcomed Canada’s economic intergration with the United States. At various points in Canadian history there have also been cries of “Canada First” and “Buy Canadian.” In the 1960s the Committee For An Independent Canada was formed by a group of concerned Canadians, and in the 1970s the federal government attempted to slow the pace of foreign investment by creating the Foreign Investment Review Agency. One reason these attempts to protect Canada’s autonomy failed is because many Canadians regard such actions as anti-American and as dangerously nationalistic. The anti-nationalist sentiment of Canadians was probably most clearly expressed by Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, who, shortly after his overwhelming electoral victory in 1984, announced to the world that Canada was now “open for business.”

Following the exuberant invitation to foreign capital, Canada’s Prime Minister went on to win another smashing victory in 1988 after which he concluded the Free Trade Agreement with the United States. Intended to expand trade between the two countries, essentially by eliminating tariff barriers, the Free Trade Agreement has proven to be highly controversial. Rather than expanding industry in Canada as its Canadian proponents had hoped, so far it has produced the opposite effect, as many corporations once producing in Canada, both American and Canadian, have moved to the United States where they can continue serving the Canadian market, but with lower production costs. How this will affect Canada’s relationship with the United States in the future remains a question.

The relationships among Canada, Japan and the United States are important for many reasons. Together these three account for about forty-three percent of the world’s economic output. Canada is now the world’s largest country in terms of land area with vast supplies of natural resources. Japan and the United States are the most technologically advanced nations in the world and control massive amounts of capital. What happens between and among them therefore is significant not only for each other but also for the rest of the world.

When problems arise among Canada, Japan and the United States, the media like to present these difficulties through such concepts as trade friction, Japan-bashing, quality of life, freedom, fairness, education standards, content percentages, and so forth. A seemingly endless stream of politicians, economists, educators, market researchers, psychologists, pop stars, and persons in the street are called upon to express their views about why Japanese consumers aren’t buying enough American cars, or to explain why Canadian children score lower than Japanese children on math quizzes, or to comment on whether government-funded medicare would lead to a loss of personal freedom in the United States.

The media can create intense public interest in such carefully packaged concepts as trade friction by focusing tremendous attention on the more emotional aspects of these issues. This is particularly the case if the “problem” involves people’s jobs and income levels, together with actions and statements by foreigners which violate the home country’s sense of values or ethics. While the media like to think they are just “telling it like it is,” the fact is they are doing little more than touching the surface of a highly complex network of economic and political relationships with their electronic babble of five-second sound bites, ten-second comment and analysis, and fifteen-second round-tables.

The problems among Canada, Japan, and America are not simply questions of whose work ethic is stronger, or whose trade barriers are fairer, or how much of a gear shift was made in Nagoya and how much was made in Pumpkin Patch, Ohio. Similarly, problems among them cannot be solved by simply abolishing tariffs, or by boycotting goods made in the other country’s factories or by reviewing foreign investment decisions.

Technology and Interdependence

Relationships among Canada, Japan and the United States become difficult at times, not because of superficial differences which push them apart, but because all three are locked together in a technological embrace which sometimes becomes so tight that it causes one or more of the partners to cry out. It is not surprising that Canada and America should be closely inter-twined. After all, they share the same continent, have cultures which are similar in many ways, and have many common interests. What is amazing though is that Japan and America should be so close, for here we have two nations which are half a world apart, have cultures which sometimes appear complete opposites, and at one time were the bitterest of enemies.

In order to gain a clearer understanding of the relationship among Canada, Japan, and the United States, it is necessary to understand something about the nature of technology, for it is primarily through their sharing of particular technological values that they maintain their relationship. By looking at technology and how these three countries developed their technological relationship, it is possible to gain a clearer understanding of their difficulties and how those difficulties may affect their future relationship.

Technology

When we use the word “technology” today, we instantly think of computers, satellites, smart bombs, compact discs, high-definition television, artificial intelligence, genetic engineering… a whole range of communication devices, military weapons, home electronic appliances, experimental projects, and so forth. While all of these are certainly manifestations of technology, they are not technology itself. This is so because technology is essentially a way of looking at and dealing with the world, it is not simply a collection of mechanical devices.[1]

Modern technology began to appear when men began to look at the world in a different way from that of the ancients. One of the main differences between the modern world and the ancient classical world is the view of nature. To the ancient Greeks, nature meant the divine order in the universe. Everything had a place in this eternal order which was determined by its nature. Men were higher than animals because of their reason but were lower than gods because they were creatures. For men to know what is good, they should contemplate the eternal order through reason and then act accordingly. Thus, for example, it was natural for humans to live in communities because humans are naturally social. Anyone who was not part of a community must be either a god or a beast; a god who didn’t need other beings or a beast who was incapable of living with humans.

For the classical man, reason was the means by which he could contemplate and understand the nature of the universe. Reason was not simply an instrument for solving problems logically, it was what helped to unite man with the eternal order and thus make his life meaningful. Reason could also help man to make things such as tools and pots. However, when man used his reason in this way, he wasn’t acting purely instrumentally. He was still part of the order of the universe and what he was doing in making a tool or a pot was both making something useful, but at the same time bringing forth something which showed the order of the universe i. e. revealing truth. The Greeks called this way of making things “techne.”

The Greeks held back from rapid technological process because they thought it was dangerous. Greek science was essentially theoretical and the Greeks believed that technology without moral and political control would lead to disastrous consequences. As Greek civilization began to decline, techne declined as well. The productive process became more instrumental, but technological progress was still held in check for many centuries by such forces as the Roman Catholic Church which inherited many aspects of the classical view of nature and which condemned many forms of progress as evil and sinful.

From the eleventh and twelfth centuries onward, the modern view of nature began to appear, thereby preparing the way for the growth of modern technology. According to the modern view, nature is not an eternal order but rather a contingency of powers. The view of man also changed. Whereas the classical thinkers believed that man was part of nature, modern thinkers believe he is outside of nature.

In order to understand the nature of modern technology we must understand both its practical meaning and its essence. Practically, technology is similar to techne because both are processes that join together means and ends. The major difference between the two involves essence. Whereas the essence of techne is revealing truth, the essence of technology is revealing the actual so it can be used as a resource (something which can be used for further use). Preceding all technological development is the perception of nature as something which is potentially useful.

According to the modern view therefore, nature is a resource, a contingency of powers which can be used by man for his own purposes. In modern technology, art and science are joined together because we want to understand and use the powers of nature for our own benefit. We don’t simply want to observe nature as a divine project, we want to develop scientific explanations of how the forces of nature operate and then use that understanding for practical purposes.

Techne maintained harmony with nature in the productive process, but technology is inherently provocative. Modern man takes both human and non-human nature as material for production. Man develops the power of nature by a process of extraction, refining, combining, and shaping. To illustrate the difference between techne and technology, consider the way an ecologist view a forest and then compare it with the way a logger views that same forest. When an ecologist looks at a forest, he sees an ecosystem, an entire relationship of animals, plants, trees, air, water, etc., all interacting and nourishing one another. When a logger looks at that same forest he may be aware of the ecosystem, but he sees the forest primarily as a resource--trees to be cut down, sawed into lumber, and joined together into houses and buildings.

When we compare our world with that of the ancients, therefore, we are not simply comparing two worlds in which the mechanical devices are different. We are also comparing two worlds in which the view of nature, the view of man, and the relation between the two are almost completely different. It is important to understand this difference when we look at the relationship between technology and politics in today’s world.

Relationships among Canada, Japan, and the United States take place within the process of technical advance. Most of the arguments and disagreements that occur among them involve technical and economic questions rather than basic political or ideological differences. However, many of these technical and economic questions are argued and debated in the political arena, and when this happens the different political interests and value systems of each country becomes important. In order to understand the relationship among Canada, Japan, and the United States therefore, it is necessary to understand the technical interdependence among them and how political factors both affect and are affected by that interdependence.

Interdependency

A technological society is a society in which the primary goal is the conquest of nature by means of rational calculation. Technological societies can develop through different types of political and economic structures. These structures will obviously affect the way in which each technological society develops and will also affect relations between and among other technological societies. Despite political and economic differences, technology is the major force shaping the modern world, and it is within the process of technological growth and development that most political and economic decisions are now made.

In a work such as this it is impossible to go into detail about the technical interdependence among Canada, Japan, and America. In broad terms we can say that each shares the view that nature should be conquered by rational calculation. In addition, each employs five basic factors to promote dynamic technological growth: natural resources, capital, labor, research and development, and markets for goods and services. To a greater or lesser degree, each of the three countries is dependent on the other for one or more of the five basic factors, and it is this dependency that leads to political interdependence. An example of how technological interdependence can lead to political interdependence and hence to political problems is the following. Japan needs to sell automobiles in the United States market because the Japanese domestic market is too small to sustain the dynamic growth of its automobile industry. In turn, Japanese competition has hurt the American automobile industry leading to less dynamic growth and hence lower profits and worker lay-offs. These problems became political problems once both the American auto industry and American workers started demanding action against Japan. The kinds of action the American government can take (e. g. banning Japanese imports, prohibiting Japanese investment, etc.) are limited because America is dependent on Japanese capital to service its debt, create new jobs and keep the American stock market buoyant. Thus, while the two nations can argue and fight with each other, neither can afford to take strong action against the other without damaging itself.

When we look at the relationship between Canada and the United States, we see a relationship that began in the eighteenth century as one of mutual fear and hostility, with relatively little interdependence. Today, of course, the two countries are highly integrated economically, share many of the same social and cultural values, and have many political linkages between them. While Canada still maintains its political sovereignty, some Canadians feel that Canada is little more than a satellite of the United States, a country with its own political institutions but an economy that is so much owned and controlled by American interests that it is impossible for those political institutions to make independent decisions concerning most significant questions.

If we examine the history of Canada, much of what the critics are saying about Canada’s lack of independence seems to be true.[2] Prior to 1914, Canada shared a strong relationship with Great Britain. Although Canada was not completely independent in matters such as foreign policy, Canadians were largely responsible for their own economic development. During the latter part of the nineteenth century, Canada achieved significant growth and development without relying on direct investment by foreigners. The Canadian Pacific Railway, for example, was largely financed by money borrowed from British banks. During this time the United States was busily industrializing and had little surplus capital to invest abroad. In fact, the United States was also using foreign capital, especially British, to help develop its industrial base.

After 1914 the world changed dramatically for Canada. The beginning of the First World War accelerated the decline of Great Britain as a world economic and political power. At the same time, the United States was now well on its way to becoming the most dynamic technological society the world had yet seen. Canada had little choice but to become part of that dynamism. To have held back from rapid growth and development and the prosperity which it promised for the masses, would have made Canada’s leaders appear as opponents of progress, and thus have subjected them to the danger of political “irrelevance.” Rather than look for an alternative vision to technology, or even try to use Canadian resources to develop a society less dependent on the United States, Canada’s leaders simply opened the door to American investment and development.

Of the five basic factors which promote technological growth, Canada failed to gain independent control over any. From the 1930s onward, American corporations were largely responsible for developing Canada’s natural resources. Rather than try to accumulate its own capital, Canada relied heavily on American investment to develop such basic resource industries as iron ore, nickel, and pulp and paper, as well as a large segment of its secondary industry. Similarly, Canada relied heavily on American research and development to provide the new products and new techniques necessary for future growth, and even a large segment of its labor force was organized by American-dominated unions.[3]

Up until the time of the Free Trade Agreement, Canada tried to protect parts of its domestic economy from cheap American imports by setting up high tariffs on particular products such as clothing and footwear. Not only were these tariff-barriers intended to protect Canadian producers against dumping, but in some cases they were meant to induce American producers to establish branch-plants in Canada, thereby providing jobs for Canadian workers. In regard to this latter consideration, i. e. encouraging industrialization in Canada, they did not necessarily encourage the development of Canadian-owned industry and in fact speeded up the creation of a branch-plant economy. With the establishment of the Free Trade Agreement, some American branch-plants have moved back to the United States from where they can continue serving the Canadian market without the impediment of high tariffs. In turn, this has led to the loss of Canadian jobs.

Whereas contemporary Canada may be said to have developed within the structure of American corporate capitalism and remains tightly constrained by those structures, the relationship between Japan and the United States is quite different. Although Japan has been highly dependent both politically and militarily on the United States since 1945, Japanese leaders never allowed their nation to come under the control of American corporate capitalism. In brief, Canada is a branch-plant of the United States, but Japan is not.

Why didn’t Japan become a branch-plant of the United States? Certainly if we look at Japan’s situation in 1945, all the conditions were there to encourage the development of a satellite economy: few people with no money or jobs… why not simply invite American and other foreign companies in to set up factories and rebuild the shattered infrastructure?

The reason why Japan didn’t become another branch-plant of American corporate capitalism in 1945 is because the Japanese people and their leaders place a very high value on their national autonomy.[4] At this point it is helpful to recall a traumatic event in Japanese history, the arrival of Commodore Perry in Tokyo Bay in 1853. The arrival of the black ships and Perry’s threat, “Open your market, or suffer the consequences” was a potentially devastating event. Until that time, Japan had remained almost completely isolated from foreign influence for over two hundred and fifty years. Japan had little knowledge of modern technology and was certainly no match for American military power. The only people who could trade with Japan during this period of isolation were the Dutch who were restricted to an island in the harbor at Nagasaki called Dejima.

The way in which Japan’s leaders responded to Perry’s threat is instructive. After making his threat, Perry promised the Japanese he would return within the year to hear their reply. The Japanese knew they could not defeat America’s superior technology. Consequently, they decided to acquire the techniques and devices of modern technology. In the meantime they would play for time and try to minimize foreign penetration. When Perry returned, therefore, the Japanese told him that immediate entry into Japanese market was a difficult problem which couldn’t be solved all at once. After the bargaining and discussion was over, Perry accepted the Japanese offer of two new places where foreigners could trade: Shimoda, a small port south of Tokyo, and Hakodate in the far north.

While continuing to frustrate and delay further foreign penetration into their country, the Japanese sent missions to Europe and America to learn about the new technology and to bring back foreign technicians to instruct them in the new skills and new techniques. Although they were resolutely committed to acquiring the techniques and mechanical devices of modern technology, they avoided direct foreign investment. This was because one of their major reasons for acquiring technology was to protect their autonomy from outsiders, not simply to achieve growth and development.

The drive to acquire technology greatly accelerated after the Meiji Restoration in 1868. The Japanese call this step in their history “Meiji Ishin,” which can be translated into English as Restoration, Reform, or even Revolution. This was a very complex step which involved many political, economic, social and technological changes. It is not possible to go into those changes here, but two points are particularly significant in terms of this essay. The first point is that the Meiji Restoration continued the process of imposing technology on Japan from above, i. e. under the control and guidance of its leaders. The second point is that in their drive to industrialize Japan, the Meiji leaders rejected most foreign investment because they knew it posed a great danger to the autonomy they were trying to protect. Instead they decided to accumulate capital by such methods as reducing Japanese consumption. Thus, from the very beginning of their development as a technological society, the Japanese decided to follow a strategy which was radically different from the one which Canada was to follow later, and which led Canada into becoming a branch-plant rather than an independent nation.

Although Japan has succeeded in achieving a high level of technological development while maintaining ownership and control of its economy, Japan’s rapid transition from an almost feudal-like society to becoming perhaps the most dynamic technological society in the world today has been both a benefit and a curse. The darker side of Japan’s drive to technology was that it was motivated in large part by military considerations. Thus, when Japan decided to industrialize in the second half of the nineteenth century, heavy industry received priority. This was decided upon so that Japan could build a modern army and navy.

The world was shocked when Japan defeated Russia in the Russo-Japanese War of 1904. Not only did this shake the West’s sense of hegemony over the East, it also sent a message to many Indians, Africans and particularly other Asians that Western imperialism could be defeated and that non-Western people could successfully use technology to do so. Unfortunately, the victory over Russia also convinced Japan’s military leaders of their nation’s prowess, thereby paving the way for the disasters of the Second World War.

The strategy and tactics which Japan used to rebuild its industrial base after 1945 were based on the same principle which had motivated Japan’s leaders in the nineteenth century—build a strong industrial base to protect Japan’s autonomy. This time, however, it was impossible to build a strong military as well. Instead the Japanese decided to build the most dynamic technological base possible, and use this, together with American military power, to protect themselves from foreign intrusion.

It is not possible to go into detail about how Japan rebuilt itself after 1945. However, it is important to realize several things about the rebuilding process. The most important point was that even though Japan was in desperate shape in 1945, Japan’s leaders refused to surrender their long-term economic autonomy in order to achieve short-term objectives. Thus, even though they were desperate for capital in the years immediately following the war, the Japanese decided to rely on savings and limited foreign borrowing rather than foreign direct investment to rebuild their industries. In addition, Japan’s leaders decided to rebuild certain strategic industries such as shipbuilding, steel, and electronics, rather than attempt an across-the-board reconstruction, because they knew these strategic industries would greatly stimulate other industries. All of this was done through the close cooperation of government, government ministries, and private corporations. Later, of course, Japan went on to develop the so-called “high-technology” industries such as computers, robotics, semi-conductors etc. for which it is so famous.

Modern history shows us that technological societies can develop through different political and economic structures. Until the present Japanese system appeared on the world stage, the three dominant forms were liberal democratic capitalism which originated in England and later shaped the political regime in the United States, Marxist communism which shaped the Soviet Union and Communist China, and National Socialism which constituted the ideological basis of Nazi Germany. The recent collapse of the Soviet Union leaves Communist China as the only major country still striving to build a technological society according to the principles laid down by Marx. Earlier in this century, the destruction of Nazi Germany shattered the National Socialist experiment, although various fragments of that movement seem to be coming to life again in France and among the remnants of the old Soviet Union.

The ideological basis of Japanese technological society contains elements of the previous three ideologies, but it is not an exact imitation of any single one. Ideologies are the teachings of political philosophers which are used by political regimes to convince the masses that what they are doing is good. The men who built modern Japan were primarily interested in technology, they did not wish to westernize Japanese society by importing liberal democracy, communism or national socialism. Thus, for example, even though the Japanese political system is formally constituted on a democratic framework (popularly elected upper and lower houses of parliament, prime minister, and cabinet responsible to the lower houses…), the political ideology of Japanese society is base on Eastern rather than Western ideas about the nature of man and what constitutes the good society. When differences over economic and technological questions arise between Japan and Western countries, these ideological differences often come into play and the failure of each to understand the other’s ideological position usually leads to even greater misunderstanding.

In attempting to understand the ideological basis of Japanese technological society, it is important to begin with a simple fact: Japan is formally democratic but it is not a liberal society. The United States of America is a liberal society through and through. American liberalism begins from the assumption that man is basically an individual and the essence of man is his freedom. From this basic assumption, American liberalism divides into two main branches. The right branch is classical liberalism which argues that the best way to protect individual freedom is to keep government as small as possible and to let the free market decide the allocation of goods and services. Classical liberals in the United States call themselves conservatives, although they are nothing like the earlier British conservatives from whom they take their name. The left branch of American liberalism begins with the belief in individual freedom as well, but in contrast to its right-wing opponents, left-wing liberalism is more willing to use the power of government to protect individual rights and bring about a more equal distribution of goods and services.

Canada is also a liberal society, but with an important difference. In Canada, liberal individualism is partially countered by organic communal values. The reason for this difference is that Canada did not radically sever its ties with Great Britain and so basic elements of British conservatism have remained within Canada’s political ideology. In contrast to classical liberalism, conservatism maintains that it is the role of government to protect the good of the community by preventing excess. Thus, in Canada, government traditionally has been more willing to establish public corporations and bring in massive social welfare schemes than has government in the United States.[5] Although these conservative elements survived for many years in the Progressive Conservative party, it would be difficult to argue that they will survive there in the 1990s. Just as the British Conservative Party threw out the last of its conservative principles in favour of classical liberalism during the Thatcher years, so too did Canada’s Progressive Conservative Party jettison its remaining conservative principles during the Mulroney years, replacing them with Reaganite conservatism which would have the public believe that true conservatism means unrestricted free trade.

Whereas the United States and Canada start with the concept of the individual in defining the political good, Japan begins from the concept of the group. This aspect of Japanese society has become a cliche used to explain almost everything about the Japanese from why they make better cars than the Americans to why there aren’t dope dealers on every street-corner of Tokyo selling heroin to school children. Despite this hackneyed use of the concept, understanding the group basis of Japanese society is essential for any person coming from the West if he or she hopes to understand anything beyond the superficialities of modern Japan.

Japan is essentially an organic society. Each person is defined by his group membership and derives power and status according to the power and status of his group affiliations. Groups are joined together to form the nation. Japanese society is vertical, with various outcastes at the bottom and the Japanese Royal Family at the top.[6] Outside of the Royal Family, the most prestigious members of Japanese society are the men who work in the top government ministries. This is because the ministries have a mission more than merely a purpose, and that mission is to protect the good of the Japanese nation. Money and political power are important factors in Japan, but they are secondary to preserving the common good. Thus, Japan is able to endure a seemingly endless series of political and financial scandals without suffering serious damage to its general well-being because the men and the institutions which are primarily responsible for protecting that well-being, i. e. the ministries, are seldom corrupted by the greed and selfish ambition which infect the political parties and many of the private corporations.

When foreigners negotiate with the Japanese over such matters as rice imports or attempt to buy out Japanese corporations and install their own members on the boards of directors, they encounter the Japanese sense of community at first hand, and are often upset by it. This is particularly true for Americans, whose sense of liberal individualism often clashes with the Japanese sense of communitarianism. Thus, when it comes to such questions as banning rice imports, American officials see this as little more than the political machinations of a greedy interest group conspiring with self-serving politicians to promote their own interests. As with all matters involving money and power, there is a certain amount of truth in these allegations. If rice imports are seen only in this light, however, the viewer misses seeing the communitarian elements at work. It goes like this. Japan wishes to preserve a meaningful segment of its agricultural base. To do this it must preserve its rice-growing communities. Consequently, Japan is willing to ban imports of foreign rice and charge Japanese consumers far more than the world price for domestically produced rice. Japanese consumers know they could buy imported rice for much less, but they also know the disastrous consequences if Japan had to face a situation where food imports were cut off and it had little or no capacity to produce its own rice. In order to see the workings of communal elements in Japanese technological society therefore, it is necessary for Westerners to remove their liberal free-market glasses and begin evaluating Japanese policies in broader terms than whether or not they meet the liberal democratic standards of their own countries.

The United States is a liberal democratic capitalist society. Japan is a bureaucratic capitalist society. In America, the belief in freedom was joined together with the belief in technology to produce a society in which men believe that by conquering nature through rational calculation they are bringing about the liberation of mankind. In Japan the belief in community was joined together with the belief in technology to produce a society in which men believe that by conquering nature through rational calculation they are ensuring the survival of the Japanese people. In both societies the conquest of nature is being carried out by large private corporations. In Japan these private corporations work closely with the bureaucrats, officials and politicians who run the government ministries and the political parties, but in American the belief in the free market system severely restricts cooperation between the public and private realms. In America, large private corporations dominate the society and every day the political system grows weaker and becomes less capable of dealing with the severe social and economic problems now facing many members of American society. In Japan, private corporations, government ministries, and political parties work together to protect the common good through a spirit of bureaucratic benevolence.

Canada is much closer to the American than to the Japanese model because, despite the existence of communitarian values in Canadian society, liberal values are much stronger than communitarian values. Canada is a branch-plant because, unlike Japan, nobody with power and authority in Canada speaks for an autonomous Canada. Many of Canada’s most important private corporations are owned and controlled by Americans, Canadian corporations are continentalist, and politicians think of little else besides winning the next election. In Japan, the government ministries strive to preserve the nation’s autonomy, but in Canada the civil service collects taxes and hands out unemployment checks. In Canada, there is no tradition of senior civil servants working closely with politicians and presidents of major Canadian corporations to preserve and protect the Canadian people by harnessing technological growth and development to the vehicle of national autonomy. In Japan, it would be unthinkable for a member of a Japanese ministry responsible for negotiating trade agreements with a foreign power to resign his position and then start working for that foreign power as an advisor. In Canada and America this sort of thing happens all the time.

When Canada signed the Free Trade Agreement with the United States in 1989, people in Asia looked on with envy. Entrepreneurs in Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong and throughout South East Asia would have jumped at the chance to compete freely in the giant American market. Today, four years later, those same people are trying to understand how a country as rich in natural resources as Canada, with a first-class education system, access to the latest technology, and plenty of cheap land to build new factories could sign a free trade agreement with the richest nation on earth and in a short time end up twenty per cent worse off than when it started. In fact, this result should not be so surprising. Successful competition in the large, technologically-advanced North American market requires large corporations with massive amounts of capital. Canada has failed to produce these types of dynamic corporations and so Canadians are participating in the new North American economy primarily by crossing the American border to purchase Canadian cigarettes at a discount and to fill the tanks of their automobiles with cut-rate gasoline. Meanwhile, Canadian companies are shutting down in Canada and moving to the United States where production costs are significantly lower. We thus have the most absurd situation imaginable—Canadian companies laying off Canadian workers, moving to the U.S., and then exporting their American-made products back to Canada where their unemployed former workers are expected to buy them.

Technology and the New World Order

The collapse of the Soviet Union is now part of history. In place of the old Cold War bipolarity we now have what America’s leaders call the New World Order. Presumably when they speak of this new order of states, America’s leaders mean a new world order of equal sovereign states, in place of a system in which half the world was enslaved by authoritarian Marxists. Assuming that this New World Order actucally comes about, it is important to contemplate its true nature and to ask the question of how it would affect the relationship among the United States, Canada, and Japan.

During earlier times when American liberals discussed the question of world order they did so under the title of internationalism. By internationalism they meant a world order based on the principles of liberty and equality. Talk of internationalism became popular during the time of F. D. Roosevelt. Under Roosevelt, protecting liberty and freedom was used as the justification for implementing the New Deal domestically, and helping others attain liberty and freedom was used as the justification for expanding American control over other countries.

When American liberals talk about spreading liberal principles internationally, they face a contradiction. This is because they are members of a society which is both liberal and technological. As liberals they believe in freedom and self-determination. As members of a technological society, they are members of a society which is expansionary by nature. The conundrum is this. How can a nation which depends on dynamic expansion for its survival also stand for self-determination by other states on which it depends for raw materials, markets for its surplus production, technological innovation, and so forth?

One need look no further than the pages of today’s newspapers to find current examples of the basic contradiction between American liberalism and technological expansion. On one page we find Arthur Schlesinger Jr. excitedly describing the collapse of the Soviet Union as “the climax of the grand political drama of the 20th century,” the century in which “the liberal democratic idea confronted its most deadly tests” ….(fascism and communism)… “The liberal democratic idea now reigns alone…” “A great challenge to liberal democracy in the new era will be to find ways by which people of diverse ethnic, religious, and racial backgrounds can live together in freedom and harmony.”[7] On another page of the same newspaper we find a different suggestion about what America’s mission in the new era should be. According to a Defense Department document quoted by the New York Times, part of the U.S. mission will be to convince potential competitors “that they need not aspire to a greater role or pursue a more aggressive posture to protect their legitimate interests.” To maintain its superiority, the United States “must sufficiently account for the interests of the advanced industrial nations to discourage them from challenging our leadership or seeking to overturn the established political and economic order.” Presumably, when the Defense Department strategists use the term “advanced industrial nations” they include states such as Canada and Japan, both of which are “advanced” and “industrial.” Thus, on the one hand we have Professor Schlesinger telling Canada and Japan that America wishes to live with them in freedom and harmony, but on the other we have the Pentagon warning them not to challenge America’s superiority.

Who then should we believe about America’s future intentions? Professor Schlesinger, leading spokesman for American liberalism—a former advisor to American presidents, a man of ideas and influence—or the team of Defense Department experts who are less concerned with articulating the virtues of their ideological beliefs and directly concerned with articulating their nation’s strategic interests in the clearest language possible? What is the real goal of America? A world of free and equal states or a world of unchallenged American superiority?

A further word on this matter deserves mention. Recently, a Japanese-American named Francis Fukuyama described the collapse of communism and the demise of earlier totalitarian systems as “the end of history.”[8] According to Fukuyama’s Hegelian analysis, there is now only one ideology of universal validity left standing in the arena, “liberal democracy, the doctrine of individual freedom and popular sovereignty.” Fukuyama claims, though, that there is a potential competitor to liberal democracy standing at the entrance and that is “the soft authoritarianism said to exist in Japan, Singapore and other of Asia’s economically vibrant states.” He goes on to say that these states are “ordered according to inegalitarian hierarchies,” and are based on communitarian rather than individualistic principles. According to Fukuyama, communitarianism leads to the following problem:

“In societies built on communitarian principles, the largest meaningful group is the nation, which ultimately cannot share common purposes with other nations. Thus, while Asia as a whole may out-compete others economically, who in the end will save Asians from each other and from the nationalism implicit in their social structures?” He concludes his essay by warning that this form of Asian nationalism could lay the ground for future conflict between Asia and the West, and within Asia itself.

I do not question the sincerity of Mr. Fukuyama’s praise of liberal democratic principles, just as I do not question the sincerity of Professor Schlesinger’s beliefs or those of the Pentagon planners. My problem with Mr. Fukuyama’s views is this—does he realize the nature of the country in which he is living? Fukuyama attacks countries like Japan and Singapore because they are “nations,” and the problem with nations is that ultimately they “cannot share common purposes with other nations.” How exactly does he regard the United States? Does he claim that America is not a “nation” because it is based on liberal principles? By what mechanisms does the United States exercise power over others if not through national institutions and in terms of a national ideology—American liberalism (land of the free, home of the brave)? Here we can introduce the liberal principle of fairness. Why is it fair for the United States to use the techniques of nationalism to build and expand its power, but it is not fair for Asian nations to do the same? How does he believe that Japan could have preserved its economic autonomy in the face of American technological dynamism if it had not rebuilt its economy on communitarian nationalist principles?

America is the only remaining nation with sufficient military, economic, technological and political resources to exercise formidable power over many countries and regions outside its own borders. Because it is an advanced technological nation, the United States can exercise its power over others without having to occupy vast stretches of territory beyond its national boundaries. The Americans have many non-violent measures they can use to bend others to their will. A short list includes such techniques as trade, aid, and debt. And since they are ahead of most other nations in technology, the U.S. can use the techniques and mechanical devises of technology as powerful bargaining tools, enriching friendly powers such as South Korea through technology transfers, and bankrupting hostile powers such as Vietnam by enforcing a world-wide technological boycott against its communist regime. A wise man once said that we should judge people by what they do and not by what they say. With this in mind, history seems to support the Pentagon planners view of America’s role in the world rather than that of Professor Schlesinger. Certainly, Canada has been well aware of the more expansionary side of American foreign policy as American consolidated its position in the Americas from the time of the Monroe Doctrine onward.

The relationship between Canada and the United States has been aptly described as that of a mouse in bed with an elephant. The mouse must be very careful at all times in case the elephant rolls over and crushes it. The watch-word for Canada’s political relationship with the United States has always been caution. Canada has been defined as a middle power in the rankings of world states. Canadians concerned about an independent foreign policy for Canada like to picture Canada as a sort of “honest broker,” a quiet diplomat acting as a negotiator and peace-maker among various disputants throughout the world. In order to promote this “honest broker” roles, some of Canada’s leaders have tried to maintain a certain distance from the United States (declining to join the Organization of American States for many years; refusing to send military forces to Vietnam; refusing to accept nuclear weapons).

Over the years, Canada’s cautious approach to its relationship with the U.S. has usually proven successful. Generally, Canada has been able to avoid getting dragged in to some of the larger disasters of American foreign policy. As a result, Canada is perceived by most parts of the world as a peaceful country. There have been times, however, when Canada’s leaders have attempted to take an independent line which strongly aroused Canada’s giant neighbor, thereby provoking America’s wrath and showing the true nature of Canada’s satellite status. One such incident was the Bomarc missile crisis which occurred in the 1960s during the Progressive Conservative Prime Ministership of John Diefenbaker. The Diefenbaker government’s refusal to accept nuclear war-heads for the Bomarc provoked the full fury of both the American and Canadian establishment. Opponents of both sides of the border had a field day in the media during the 1963 federal election portraying Canada under Diefenbaker’s rule as an unreliable ally and accusing Canada of refusing to do its part in defending North America by refusing to become a nuclear power. Of course Diefenbaker and his party lost the election. By the time the Vietnam War appeared, Canada’s leaders had “wised up” and even though Canada did not participate in the war by sending troops, Canada did provide munitions. In addition, the Liberal government made sure to keep any criticism of the war private and very quiet.

The Gulf War struck Japan’s political leadership a stunning blow, just as the Bomarc Missile Crisis had struck Canada’s leaders a devastating shot almost thirty years earlier. Japan’s refusal to send troops to the Gulf, together with its reluctance to donate large sums of money on demand to help pay the enormous costs, provoked a torrent of abuse in the United States. Once again that dreaded label “unreliable ally” was dusted off by the media hot-shots and once more a friendly power was made to feel ashamed for “refusing to do its part.” Naturally, the media’s abuse subsided once Japan came up with the requisite donation, together with an apology for the unfortunate misunderstanding.

Since 1945, Japan, like Canada, has tried to maintain a low profile internationally. This is consistent with Japan’s historical desire to maintain its autonomy and remain out of foreign entanglements as much as possible. The constitution which the Americans wrote for the Japanese during the occupation, particularly the section renouncing the use of force for other than defensive purposes, was consistent with Japan’s traditional isolationist sentiments and was an effective method for frustrating the re-birth of militarism in Japan. Since 1945, Japan has maintained the spirit of the constitution. Internationally, Japan has become heavily-involved economically, but has played a relatively minor role politically and no role militarily. Until the Gulf War this situation was generally satisfactory for both the Americans and the Japanese.

What was particularly troubling about the Gulf War “misunderstanding “ for the Japanese was America’s failure to understand Japan’s position in the matter. For over forty years Japan had faithfully refrained from sending military forces abroad. Domestically, a careful balance of formal and informal rules and understandings had been patiently established to neutralize aggressive militarism. Suddenly this delicate balance was beset by a pack of angry sound-bites, self-righteous op-eds, and sneering hotel-room warriors demanding that Japan jump in and do its bit. For the Japanese, this demand for immediate change was reminiscent of the “fifteen minute” notice they had been given by the United States administration when President Nixon visited Communist China in 1972. Although they contributed the money demanded to pay for vanquishing Saddam Hussein, America’s hard-ball tactics left the Japanese with another bad memory of how the Americans like to demand instant action whenever they find it necessary.

While Japan was busily ducking flak from the American media during the Gulf War, Canada was busily playing the “good neighbor.” Dispatching ground forces to the Middle East would have been unacceptable domestically in Canada, so the Mulroney government dutifully showed the flag by sending a flotilla of three aged destroyers and a small air force contingent. This earned Canada a place in the victory parades through Detroit and Hamtramack as well as a pat on the head from a grateful President Bush.

Today we see a world in which the United States is the only superpower. Despite the long reach of American influence, American military power is limited by the staggering costs of modern military technology. One reason the Americans pushed Japan and other states so strongly to contribute to the costs of the Gulf War was that the Americans simply couldn’t afford to pay the enormous costs by themselves.

The demise of the Soviet Union has decreased the need for military cooperation in the West and between the West and parts of Asia. At the present time, the world is consolidating into three major technological groups: North America, led by the United States; the European Community led by Germany; and a third group in Asia in which Japan dominates technologically, but does not lead politically. Many states and parts of old states are now scrambling desperately to join one of these groups because they realize this is their main hope of gaining access to the capital and technology they require for rapid growth and development.

How will these massive economic, political and technological changes affect the relationship among the United States, Canada, and Japan? First, Canada. As I sit at my desk in Tokyo watching my native country go through yet another series of economic and political “crisis,” I am neither shocked nor amazed. Most people I grew up with in the1950s feel the same. We’ve watched The Great Canadian Tragedy so many times that we know the plot by heart.

The Great Canadian Tragedy goes like this. Every few years Canadians get into an enormous panic involving three constantly recurring crises. One crisis is the economy, the second is Quebec, and the third involves whatever party and prime minister happens to be in office at the time. Failure to deal with one or both of the first two “crises” invariably results in a protracted “leadership crisis” in Canada, during which the prime minister’s popularity unfailingly plummets in the opinion polls to the same level as that enjoyed by used-can salesmen and divorce lawyers. Once the prime minister’s standing hits rock bottom, “angry and desperate people in all parts of Canada” begin demanding “significant constitutional changes,” “leaders who care about people,” and “a new sharing of power not based on language, race, gender, or sexual preference.”

There is never a surprise outcome to The Great Canadian Tragedy—the butler does it every time. Occasionally, the cast of characters changes as vigorous young leaders replace tired old war horses, and sometimes we get a different spin on who is really to blame for the latest outrage (the current villains are white heterosexual males, English Canada—particularly the central part, the G.S.T., the white man, the media, the United States Customs and Immigration). Of course, every successful tragedy must have its Greek chorus. In Canada, each performance of The National Tragedy is accompanied by a fine chorus made up primarily of puffed-up academics, electronic talking heads, political rat-packs, native leaders in native regalia, outraged feminists, angry union leaders, and former provincial premiers out on bail. No matter how much the moving face of reality may change, the chorus is always with us, crying about every demand they haven’t had satisfied, moaning over any change of policy, and shouting and tearing their hair whenever anyone attempts to unite the country. While Canadians are engrossed in the latest performance of The National Tragedy (this year’s themes are Who Caused the Recession? and How Can We Make Quebec Happy?), the forces of technology continue moving on relentlessly. What we see happening in Canada is the deconstruction of a country. Technology is now more powerful than any political particularity it encounters. Canada no longer has a political center. It is no longer possible to make The Big Decision which will put Humpty Dumpty back together again. North America has become a single technological society in which Canada’s politicians have enormously less influence over corporations, capital and people than they like to pretend they do. Everyday the men who run the private corporations of North America are saying that the existence of Canada is not important—North America is a borderless continent with a single economy in which political particularisms hold back technological progress.

Some Canadians who still worry about Canada’s long-lost independence think that a Canada-Japan relationship can in some way act as a counterweight to the highly imbalanced Canadian-American relationship. They seem to think that by inviting Japanese corporations to set up in Canada and compete in the North American free trade market, Canada can become more independent. This is an empty policy. It is empty for two reasons. In the first place, Japan realizes that Canada is a branch-plant of the United States. When disputes arise between Canada and the United States, why would the Japanese side with the branch-plant against the parent firm? What could they possibly gain by such a move? The second reason why the “Japanese alternative” is an empty policy in terms of increasing Canada’s independence is because Japanese corporations are just as nationalistic as American corporations. Policies made in Tokyo or Osaka are not significantly different in terms of Canada’s economic autonomy from policies made in New York or Detroit. Japanese multi-national corporations based in Canada and serving the North American market would be Japanese first and Canadian second.

If it is the fate of satellite Canada to break up in orbit around planet America, what then is the fate of Japan?

The growth of the Japanese technological society continues to strengthen Japanese autonomy and to increase Japan’s economic influence internationally. The strategy of using growth and development to protect its national autonomy has made Japan the second richest nation in the world without costing the Japanese people their economic and political independence. Currently, the Japanese economy is three-fifths the size of the American economy. Some economists estimate that Japan could even have an economy that is 90 per cent the size of the United States economy within a decade. While continuing to discourage foreign penetration into the Japanese economy, the Japanese have been investing massive sums of money to prepare for the next round of technological competition in the mid 1990s. Since 1986, they have been pouring capital into rationalizing production, developing new products and services, and building new capacity. This will give them the technological base and the next generation of products to enhance their position in the world economy even further in the next round of economic expansion.

As Japan’s technological power increases, Japan’s political relationship with the United States is changing dramatically. Throughout the post-war era, Japan has been highly dependent on the United States for access to American technology and American markets, as well as the American military for protection against outside threats. This made Japan susceptible to American influence and pressure in such areas as foreign policy, trade practices and domestic economic reforms. Now these twin dependencies are diminishing. Japan is leading ahead of the Americans in key areas of technology (super-conductivity, robotics, materials and electronics) and developing alternative markets for its products (already trade with Asia exceeds that with the United States by 25 percent). At the same time, the demise of the Soviet Union, together with the shift of Communist China away from hard-line Marxism and towards a market economy, means that Japan is now less dependent militarily on the United States for protection against these once-hostile powers.

Japan’s new technological power gives it the strength to take a more independent line in dealing with the Americans and with the rest of the world. Recently, the Americans have encountered a new sense of confidence on the Japanese side in the seemingly interminable series of trade problems between the two nations. At the same time, Japan has been developing its own policies on such issues as relations with Vietnam and North Korea, investment in China, and where and how to distribute its foreign aid.

On the American side, most Americans did not become fully aware of Japan’s new status until recently. What finally grabbed America’s attention was President Bush’s ill-fated visit to Japan in February of 1992. Originally intended as a “Victory Lap” around Asia following the successful conclusion of the Gulf War, at the last minute a group of over-paid executives from America’s most poorly managed private corporations was hastily added to the President’s entourage to show the folks back home how much everybody was doing to force the Japanese to start Buying American. Rather than backing up their leader, the executives quickly formed their own Greek chorus, and began whining about everything he tried to do. The climax of this tragedy came when the exhausted president, staggering around Tokyo like a wounded deer, suddenly collapsed into the arms of the Japanese prime minister during a state banquet. Despite the best efforts of the president’s public relations people to put the best possible spin on the disaster, Americans finally realized the magnitude of the Japanese “problem.” Subsequent statements by the Japanese Prime Minister concerning the flagging American work ethic, together with his explanation that “promises” and “commitments” by Japanese automobile executives to Buy American were really only goals and targets, further reinforced the original message that the Japanese were no longer going to run and hide whenever the men with the big cowboy hats rode into town.

If the Japanese leaders who saw Commodore Perry steam into Tokyo Bay in 1853 were able to see today’s Japan, they would be amazed by the results of their commitment to modernize their country. Not only has Japan matched matched match the West in technology, is it now starting to move beyond it in many areas. In fact, the Japanese have been so successful at achieving technological growth while maintaining their national autonomy, that many other states are now examining the Japanese model to see if it can provide an alternative to the type of frontier free-market economics which many in the West insist is the only way to build a modern technological society.

Despite the unquestioned success of the Japanese in using dynamic technological growth to protect their national independence, questions concerning other aspects of Japanese technological society remain unanswered. These are not simply questions about the obvious problems which many critics of Japan are quick to raise—questions about pollution, over-work, inequality of the sexes, and so forth. Rather, these are questions about the nature of technology itself, how it affects the lives of people living in a highly advanced technological society, and in particular, how technology affects the power of people to shape the society in which they live through their democratic institutions.